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A VICTIM OF ABUSE SHOULD STILL HAVE
A CASTLE: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
CASTLE DOCTRINE TO INSTANCES OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Cristina Georgiana Messerschmidt*
In light of a nation-wide discussion about expanding self-defense laws,
as well as an increased recognition of domestic violence, the phrases
“stand your ground” and “retreat to the wall” have taken on entirely new
meanings. In cases of domestic abuse, which happen largely inside the
home, self-defense laws become more difficult to navigate when victims
retaliate against their abusers. Generally, individuals using deadly force
against their attackers cannot do so until they “retreat to the wall”—until
they do everything possible to safely escape the attack and avoid taking a
human life. It is then, and only then, that they are justified in using deadly
force against their aggressor.
However, an age-old doctrine called the Castle Doctrine, says that an
individual does not have an affirmative duty to “retreat to the wall” if that
individual is assaulted in her own home.1 Speaking more succinctly, a
person can “stand her ground” in her own “castle” or home; she can use
deadly force against an aggressor even if safe retreat is available to her.

* J.D., Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2017. B.A., University of Michigan, 2010.
Thank you to my family, who has always encouraged my pursuit of law. Thank you to Tim
Janas, who helped me come up with a topic that was both novel and meaningful to me. Last,
but certainly not least, thank you to the editors of the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, who helped polish this piece and added diverse perspectives to the issues I
discuss.
1
Here and throughout this Comment, the pronouns “she” and “her” are used to refer to
the victim-defendant and “him” and “his” to refer to the aggressor-victim. According to the
National Domestic Violence Outline, 3 in 10 (29%) women and 1 in 10 (10%) men in the
United States experience some form of domestic violence over the course of a year. From
1994 to 2010, roughly 4 in 5 victims of domestic violence were female. Get the Facts &
Figures, THE NATIONAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, http://www.thehotline.org/resources/
statistics/. Nonetheless, this Comment acknowledges that domestic abuse is not a one-way
street; men can be abused by women just as women can be abused by men.
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When it comes to violence between cohabitants, the applicability of the
Castle Doctrine is neither clear nor consistent. Traditionally, courts have
been reticent in applying this doctrine to cases where the victim and the
offender share the same “castle.” Some states still require individuals who
are attacked in their own home by a cohabitant to “retreat to the wall,”
instead of “standing their ground” against their attacker. As such, some
victims of domestic violence find themselves in a precarious situation,
having to retreat farther than they would have to if they were being
attacked by a stranger.
This Comment analyzes and critiques the applicability of the Castle
Doctrine to instances of domestic violence. It begins by analyzing the way
the Castle Doctrine has evolved, from its introduction into American law to
the modern day. It concludes that a number of courts still struggle in
situations where the victim and the aggressor share the same “castle,”
often requiring victims of domestic violence to retreat further than they are
able to. More so, a number of state legislatures have either not addressed
this issue in their laws, or have explicitly identified cohabitant violence as
an exception to the Castle Doctrine. This Comment critiques the errors and
misconceptions that have led to this misapplication of the Castle Doctrine.
Finally, the Comment offers some recommendations that take into account
the precarious nature of domestic violence and suggest a more homogenous
method for applying the Castle Doctrine to such cases.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 595
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CASTLE DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA.......... 601
II. STATE OF THE LAW ............................................................................... 608
III. THE CASTLE DOCTRINE IN MODERN ACADEMIC DISCOURSE ............ 610
General Discussion of Self-Defense Principles ............................. 610
Discussion of Power and Gender Dynamics .................................. 613
Discussion of Property Rights in the Context of Marriage or
Cohabitation ............................................................................ 615
IV. ADVOCATING FOR APPLICATION OF THE CASTLE DOCTRINE TO
INSTINCES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE .............................................. 617
V. THE BATTERED WOMAN’S CASTLE ..................................................... 620
FINAL THOUGHTS ...................................................................................... 624

5. MESSERSCHMIDT

2016]

3/2/2017 3:49 PM

CASTLE DOCTRINE AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

595

INTRODUCTION
2

Imagine two scenarios. In the first scenario, Billy and his wife Sue are
sleeping soundly in their second-floor bedroom, when they are woken up by
the sound of broken glass on the first floor. Billy grabs his gun, which he
keeps in his night stand, and rushes towards the stairs. He sees movement
and the shadow of an intruder. At this point, Billy has two choices: he can
either safely retreat to his bedroom and call the police (who will be there in
a matter of minutes), or he can rush down the stairs, ambush the trespasser,
and shoot him. Billy chooses the second option and kills the intruder. The
police show up minutes later. Billy is arrested and later charged with
second-degree murder. At trial, Billy argues that he had acted in selfdefense—in defense of life and property, to be more exact—and that he had
no choice but to shoot the intruder.
At the conclusion of his trial, the judge informs the jury that an
individual is justified in using deadly force if that individual does so while
trying to prevent a felony from being committed against himself or his
dwelling.3 More specifically, the judge tells the jury that an individual is
justified in using deadly force only if he believes that the force is necessary
to prevent “imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] while
resisting: 1. another’s attempt to murder [him] [her], or 2. any attempt to
commit (applicable felony) upon [him] [her], or 3. any attempt to commit
(applicable felony) upon or in any dwelling occupied by [him] [her].”4
However, since Billy was upstairs, where he and his family could have
safely locked themselves in the bedroom and waited for the police, the
judge also discusses an individual’s “duty to retreat” before taking another
person’s life.5 Despite this affirmative duty, the judge concludes by
discussing the Castle Doctrine, which says that an individual does not have
an affirmative duty to retreat if he is attacked in his own dwelling, as Billy
was on the night in question.6 Billy is ultimately acquitted by the jury.
2

The two scenarios used in this Comment are purely fictional. The facts have been
doctored to reflect issues that will be addressed in this Comment. Any semblance to real-life
situations or cases that have been tried in United States courts is purely coincidental.
3
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.02 (West 1997) (“The use of deadly force is justifiable when a
person is resisting any attempt to murder such person or to commit any felony upon him or
her or upon or in any dwelling house in which such person shall be.”); Fla. Std. Jury Instr.
(Crim.) 3.6(f).
4
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f).
5
Robert Hall Smith, The Retreat to the Wall Doctrine of Self-Defense, 39 KY. L.J. 353,
353–54 (1951) (“At the very beginning the so-called ‘retreat to the wall’ doctrine became a
necessary part of the law of self-defense. If one murderously assailed could escape the attack
by retreating, he had to do so rather than kill.”).
6
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) § 3.6(f).
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The second scenario paints a picture of a different kind of couple: Bob
and Mary. Although they have been married for many years, Bob often
loses his temper with Mary over minor details. When this happens, he
throws objects at her, berates her, hits her, and threatens to humiliate her in
front of their family and friends. One night, Bob becomes irate when he
comes home and does not find beer in the fridge. He yells at Mary for not
being a good wife and throws a pot full of hot water at her. Luckily, Mary is
able to duck out in time and is not injured. Bob then tells her that he is
going to seriously hurt her if she does not go out and get him some beer.
Mary goes out, but the stores are closed. She comes back home and
tells Bob that the stores were not open, but before she can say anything else,
Bob charges at her, yelling and swearing. Mary rushes up the stairs and into
the bedroom, where she grabs Bob’s gun from his nightstand. She runs
toward the bathroom, where she can safely lock herself inside and call the
police, who will be there in a matter of minutes. However, as soon as she
hears Bob following her up the stairs, she freezes. When he walks into the
room, even though she is standing steps away from a safe retreat, Mary
shoots Bob in the chest, after which she promptly calls the police. Mary is
arrested and charged with second-degree murder.
At trial, Mary claims self-defense, arguing that she felt her life was
threatened by Bob’s repeatedly abusive behavior. At the conclusion of her
trial, the judge refuses to provide the Castle Doctrine instruction (provided
to Billy in the example above) because Bob and Mary were cohabitants;
Bob was a lawful resident of the home in which he assaulted Mary.7 Since
Mary’s ‘castle’ was also Bob’s home, and since the two lived together in
this home, the judge denies the defense’s request for the Castle Doctrine
instruction.8 The jury finds Mary guilty and she is sentenced to ten years in
prison.

If the defendant [was not engaged in an unlawful activity and] was attacked in any place where
[he] [she] had a right to be, [he] [she] had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand [his] [her]
ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if [he] [she] reasonably believed that it
was necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [another] or to
prevent the commission of a forcible felony.

Id.
7
See supra note 6. On its face, the jury instruction only addresses instances where the
victim “unlawfully and forcibly” entered the defendant’s home. In Florida, judge-made law
has most recently interpreted the Castle Doctrine to apply to incidents between cohabitants,
just as it does to incidents between a lawful occupant and an unlawful intruder. See infra
Part I.
8
Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense,
86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 654 (2003) (describing the jury instructions in Weiand, infra note
22).
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It is not unfathomable to believe that, in the first scenario, Billy
reacted as any reasonable man would have in his position. He felt
threatened and took action to protect himself, his family, and his property
by eliminating that threat. Even if Billy could have safely retreated into his
bedroom and called the police, the law states that he was justified to do
whatever he felt was necessary because the intrusion happened on his
property.9 The second scenario, however, may prove more problematic to
parse. Knowing all the facts, few would debate the fact that Mary must have
actually felt afraid for her life not only due to Bob’s actions on that
particular night, but also due to his history of physical abuse. However,
Mary’s failure to retreat into the bathroom—unlike Billy’s failure to retreat
into his bedroom—may raise questions regarding Mary’s choice to use
deadly force against her husband, a legal co-occupant of the home where
the incident happened. In some courts,10 the fact that Mary and the victimaggressor11 (Bob) were cohabitants would prevent her from presenting the
Castle Doctrine instruction to the jury.
The Castle Doctrine, a long-standing concept12 in American legal
tradition, originates in English common law.13 In its simplest form, the
Castle Doctrine permits an individual to use deadly force against her
aggressor without retreating or attempting to retreat before acting against

9

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A) (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“[T]he actor is not
obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is
assailed in his place of work by another person whose place of work the actor knows it to
be.”).
10
Currently, the following states have statutes that impose a duty to retreat upon victims
of domestic violence before meeting their aggressor’s force with deadly force: Alabama,
Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
Denise Crisafi, No Ground to Stand Upon?: Exploring the Legal, Gender, and Racial
Implications of Stand Your Ground Laws in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence 108–09
(2016) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Central Florida) (on file with the
University of Central Florida Libraries, University of Central Florida). However, case law is
changing rapidly and the courts’ interpretation of these statutes has been increasingly
favoring victims of domestic violence. For a detailed discussion of the state of the law, see
infra Part II (State of the Law).
11
The term “victim-aggressor” is used to define individuals who, like Bob, are the
initial aggressors in a confrontation, but end up as victims following a retaliation. The term
will be used consistently throughout this Comment.
12
Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 237, 242–43 (2008); see also infra Part I (discussing the emergence of the Castle
Doctrine in U.S. law as early as 1895).
13
Suk, supra note 12, at 242 (stating that “the ‘castle doctrine,’ as a self-defense rule,
provided that, in his home, a man had no duty to retreat from an intruder’s violence before
using deadly force in self-defense”); see also EDWARD HYDE EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
271 (P. R. Glazebrook ed., Professional Books Limited 1972).
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him, but only if she is being attacked in her own dwelling.14 One of the
most widely-accepted definitions of the Castle Doctrine was first penned by
Edward Hyde East in Pleas of the Crown,15 where he stated, “[a] man may
repel force by force in defense of his person, habitation, or property, against
one who manifestly intends and endeavors, by violence or surprise, to
commit a known felony, such as murder, rape, robbery, arson, burglary, and
the like, upon either.”16 In American law, Justice Benjamin Cardozo
articulated this principle in People v. Tomlins,17 saying,
In case a man [“]is assailed in his own house, he need not flee as far as he can, as in
other cases of se defendendo, for he hath the protection of his house to excuse him
from flying, as that would be to give up the protection of his house to his adversary by
flight.[”] Flight is for sanctuary and shelter, and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the
18
home.

The Castle Doctrine has been frequently invoked and successfully used
as a defense in cases that resemble the first scenario.19 When the aggressor
has been an intruder into the victim-aggressor’s home, the defense has
seldom been challenged.20 However, the application of the Castle Doctrine
in cases involving violence among cohabitants is still highly contentious,
both in public discourse and among legal scholars.21 Even though there is
an increased acknowledgement of the prevalence of domestic violence in
the United States, courts still disagree on whether a woman being attacked
in her home by her husband or other male co-habitant can react the same
way she would if she were being attacked by an intruder.22
14

See infra Part I; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2015). The
concept of retreating to the wall is essential in self-defense. According to the Model Penal
Code, as well as established case law, an individual is not entitled to use deadly force against
another individual unless she has made all efforts to retreat to safety. Id. This requirement
attempts to balance the aggressor’s right to life with the right of the person being aggressed
to defending himself.
15
EAST, supra note 13 (emphasis omitted).
16
Id.
17
213 N.Y. 240 (N.Y. 1914).
18
Id. at 243 (quoting MATTHEW HALE, 1 PLEAS OF THE CROWN 486 (1800)).
19
See, e.g., LUIS DEBONOPAULA, CASTLE DOCTRINE AND COHABITANTS: A SELECTIVE,
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (2015) (citing cases in which cohabitants were involved in
deadly conflicts with one another).
20
See id.; see also infra Part I (discussing several cases in which the Castle Doctrine
defense was successful, particularly when the defendant was attacked by a trespasser in his
dwelling).
21
See DEBONOPAULA, supra note 19; see also infra Parts I–II.
22
See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1053 (Fla. 1999); see also State v. Thomas,
673 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (Ohio 1997); Hava Dayan & Emanuel Gross, Between the Hammer
and the Anvil: Battered Women Claiming Self-Defense and a Legislative Proposal to Amend
Section 3.04(2)(b) of the U.S. Model Penal Code, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 17, 18 (2015)
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Although the State—police officers, judges, prosecutors—is supposed
to protect victims regardless of the place where they are victimized, the
home is a highly private environment—one that keeps secrets in and
intruders out.23 Domestic violence is often hidden masterfully well, making
it very difficult for victims to disclose their plight and receive adequate
justice.24 When domestic conflicts escalate into deadly incidents, the
boundary between the private home and the public space becomes
increasingly unclear.25 In cases where victims of domestic violence retaliate
against their partners, it is often the case that the term “victim” is
questioned, because the violence has often been kept secret up to that
point.26 The secrets of the home, all of a sudden, come out into the public
eye, forcing the State to pry into the private environment of the home.
Furthermore, our society’s increased focus on property and privacy
rights proves problematic when considering the applicability of the Castle
Doctrine to conflicts between cohabitants.27 In a situation where the victim
and the aggressor live under the same roof (i.e., own or rent the same home,
enjoy the same property-related privileges, and have the same propertyrelated obligations), it is difficult to find a justification for applying the
“every man’s home is his castle” logic. After all, the ultimate question
seems to be: whose castle is it? The victim’s? Or the aggressor’s?
This Comment explores the question of whether the Castle Doctrine
should apply in instances of domestic violence, like that between Mary and
Bob. To put the question another way: in domestic violence situations such
as those depicted in the second scenario, should the defendant be entitled to
a jury instruction that clearly states that the affirmative duty to retreat28 does
(outlining the statistics regarding domestic violence and citing that “about 3 million women
suffer each year from serious or life-threatening violence”).
23
See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN & ROXANNE MYKITIUK, THE PUBLIC
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE (1994).
24
Id.
25
Margaret E. Johnson, A Home with Dignity: Domestic Violence and Property Rights,
2014 BYU L. REV. 1, 12 (2014) (“For many years, there was a sense that the home is, or
should be, an inviolable place even if violence was being perpetrated by one family member
against another.”).
26
See Deborah King, The Secret Shame of Domestic Violence, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
(Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/mining-the-headlines/201410/thesecret-shame-domestic-violence; see also Leslie Morgan Steiner, Why Domestic Violence
Victims Don’t Leave, TED TALKS (Jan. 2013), https://www.ted.com/talks/leslie_morgan_
steiner_why_domestic_violence_victims_don_t_leave/transcript?language=en.
27
See DEBONOPAULA, supra note 19. See generally MARK C. SCHUG ET AL., FOCUS:
UNDERSTANDING ECONOMICS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (2006).
28
See People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 242 (N.Y. 1914) (holding that “[b]efore a man
can use force and violence under the law for his own protection, the danger must be
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not exist when a person is attacked in her own dwelling?
Part I of this Comment begins by investigating the origins of the Castle
Doctrine, first as discussed in early English law, then through Beard v.
United States29 and Pell v. State,30 two of the earliest instances when the
Castle Doctrine was cited and analyzed in American legal discourse. The
analysis aims to identify the core principles behind the Castle Doctrine as
they were first introduced into American legal discourse. Focusing on the
state of Florida,31 where courts have been inconsistent in applying the
Castle Doctrine to incidents of domestic violence, this Comment then
examines the development of the doctrine throughout the 1900s and into the
early 2000s, concluding that the application of the Castle Doctrine in
American law has changed over the course of the last 150 years. While the
early opinions focus on the victim’s right to defend herself, as well as the
fact that she has already retreated into her sanctuary, the later courts shift
their focus toward the aggressor’s legal right to be in his own dwelling
(which, naturally, is also the victim’s dwelling), pushing the victim into the
background. This change shifts the attention away from the victim’s right to
safety and bodily integrity in her own home, placing an already-victimized
individual under enhanced scrutiny to justify her actions.
Part II provides a brief overview of the “State of the Law.” It begins by
analyzing where the decision in Weiand v. State32 has left the state of
Florida in terms of courts’ abilities and obligations to apply the Castle
Doctrine to instances of domestic violence. It continues by summarizing the
state of the law, delineating the differences between “Stand Your Ground”
and “Duty to Retreat” states, as well as examining which of these states
explicitly require victims of domestic violence to retreat in their own homes
when attacked by their cohabitants.33
imminent; he must have reasonable cause for believing that the danger exists, and that he
must be so situated, he must be in such a position, that he cannot safely retreat. . . . We may
not feel always like retreating in the face of an attack; it may not seem manly to us, but it is
the law that if a man can safely retreat, and thereby escape a conflict with another, he must
do so, even though it may not seem dignified and manly.”); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
29
158 U.S. 550 (1895).
30
122 So. 110 (Fla. 1929).
31
See generally Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: Florida’s Castle Doctrine for
the Twenty-First Century, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 504 (discussing that in 2005,
Florida, “a notoriously violent state,” codified the doctrine of self-defense, as well as the
Castle Doctrine, into a set of statutes known as the “Stand Your Ground Laws.” This group
of statutes are unparalleled in that they “appear to do away with some of the traditional
considerations of necessity and proportionality.”).
32
732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999).
33
Cristafi, supra note 10, at 92 (stating that twenty-three states have Stand Your Ground
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Part III analyzes secondary literature on the topic and sorts the
academic arguments into three categories: general principles of self-defense
law, discussion of power and gender dynamics, and discussion of property
rights in the context of marriage and cohabitation. The secondary literature
analysis shows a similar trend to the case analysis performed in Part I—that
the current justifications for some courts’ refusal to read the Castle Doctrine
jury instruction in domestic violence situations come from inappropriate
applications of the Castle Doctrine, which display an increased focus on
property rights and stray away from the right to safety and self-defense in
the home.34 Furthermore, much of the secondary literature points out what
courts often fail to acknowledge: that a victim of domestic violence has
already retreated as far as she can go, according to the underlying rationale
of the Castle Doctrine.
Part IV hones in on the applicability of the Castle Doctrine to instances
of domestic violence. It argues that the Castle Doctrine jury instruction
should be granted as a matter of course in cases such as Mary’s. A refusal
to grant this jury instruction runs contrary to the baseline principles of the
Castle Doctrine, as they were stated in early English law and early cases in
American law. In jurisdictions where the Castle Doctrine is not applied in
domestic violence scenarios, its principles are misapplied; the focus is
misplaced on property rights, even though the original Castle Doctrine
focused on the protection of one’s personal space and physical integrity, in
a place where one was legally entitled to exist.
Finally, Part V addresses the helplessness of domestic violence victims
by looking at two different theories: Battered Woman Syndrome and the
Survivor Theory. This Comment argue that a battered woman’s
helplessness makes her unable to flee her home, that she has retreated as far
as she can go, and that requiring her to further retreat is not only contrary to
the principles behind the Castle Doctrine, but downright impossible.
However, given the criticism that these psychological and sociological
theories have been met with by the legal community, this Comment
identifies this as a topic for future research.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CASTLE DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA
Part I of this Comment begins by discussing the historical origins of
the Castle Doctrine, analyzing the earliest U.S. Supreme Court case that
Statutory Law, ten states have Stand Your Ground Case Law, and seventeen states have a
Duty to Retreat); id. at 108–09 (stating that, of the states that have Stand Your Ground laws,
eight currently require a “Duty to Retreat” for victims of domestic violence, intimate partner
violence, or family violence).
34
See generally FINEMAN & MYKITIUK, supra note 23.
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tackled the doctrine, and then focusing on the development of the doctrine
in the state of Florida.35 This historical overview hones in on the language
in the opinions, as well as the progression of various courts’ interpretations
of the Castle Doctrine.
The origins of the Castle Doctrine come from English self-defense
law. At the time Beard was decided in the late 1800s—one of the first
American legal cases interpreting the Castle Doctrine—East’s Pleas of the
Crown was one of the leading authorities on English law.36 In his book,
East clearly outlines the parameters of self-defense: that a person may repel
force against his “person, habitation, or property” through force, against an
aggressor who intends “to commit a known felony.”37 Francis Wharton’s
Criminal Law cites the same three types of crimes—against person,
habitation, or property—as instances where the victim of the attack does not
have to retreat: “[The victim] is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his
adversary till he find himself out of danger; and if, in a conflict between
them, he happen to kill, such killing is justifiable.”38
These early sources of English law focus on defense as the main
principle behind the Castle Doctrine. According to these authorities, an
attack on one’s bodily integrity, one’s dwelling, or one’s property justifies
the victim’s attack on his intruder, as far as it would remove the victim from
danger, regardless of the consequences on the intruder’s life.39 This early
approach brings to the forefront the victim’s right to feel safe and be free of
danger.40 In fact, the victim is given license to pursue the intruder in his
home until he finds himself out of danger.
At its inception, the Castle Doctrine focused on the rights of the person
whose dwelling, property, or bodily integrity was being compromised.
However, the modern version of the Castle Doctrine places less emphasis
on these rights and more emphasis on the definition of an individual’s
castle, the relationship between victim and aggressor, and legal property
rights. This modern interpretation of the Castle Doctrine proves particularly
problematic in instances of domestic violence, when the aggressor and the
victim-aggressor are cohabitants.
The first case in American legal discourse to address the Castle
35
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the reason why Florida was
chosen as the state for this limited case analysis).
36
EAST, supra note 13.
37
Id. at 271.
38
2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1019 (Phila., Kay and Brother 1874) (emphasis added).
39
See EAST, supra note 13.
40
Id.
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Doctrine directly was Beard in 1895.41 In Beard, the defendant shot and
killed a man who provoked and assaulted him on his property, although not
in his house.42 The victim was a trespasser who had been warned by
multiple people to stay away from the defendant and off his property.43
Beard made its way to the Supreme Court because the lower courts
imposed a duty to retreat upon the defendant, who could have safely done
so and thus avoided taking another man’s life.44 However, the majority, in
an opinion written by Justice Harlan, disagreed with the lower courts.45
Justice Harlan identified the imposition of the duty to retreat as an error of a
serious character, arguing that:
[t]he accused being where he had a right to be, on his own premises, constituting a
part of his residence and home at the time the deceased approached him in a
threatening manner . . . [the accused] had at the moment he struck the deceased,
reasonable grounds to believe, and in good faith believed, that he could not save his
life or protect himself from great bodily harm except for doing what he did . . . .46

In the opinion, Justice Harlan brought up two essential concepts. First,
that according to the laws of self-defense, an individual “must avoid taking
life if he can with due regard to his own safety.”47 Second, that there is “one
place where [the individual] need not retreat any further, where he need not
go away from the danger, and that is in his dwelling house.”48 These two
points are essential in understanding the role of the Castle Doctrine in cases
of domestic violence. Consistent with existing self-defense principles,
Justice Harlan points out that in a conflictual situation, regardless of the
location, an individual must only retreat if he can safely do so, implying that
if the individual does not feel that he can safely do so, he is not obligated to
retreat. Furthermore, Justice Harlan used the phrase “any further” to talk
about individuals who are attacked in their own homes, implying that they
have essentially already retreated as far as they can go (i.e., “to the wall”).
A second prominent case, Danford v. State,49 was among the first cases
to address the Castle Doctrine in the state of Florida. In this case, the
defendant shot a sixteen-year-old boy on a public road that was

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

158 U.S. 550 (1895).
Beard, 158 U.S. at 553.
Id. at 552–53.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
Id. at 555.
53 Fla. 4 (Fla. 1907).
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approximately 250 yards north of the defendant’s house.50 Justice Hocker of
the Florida Supreme Court assigned several errors to the lower court’s
holding for the defendant,51 including the lower court’s failure to recognize
the defendant’s affirmative duty to retreat, since the altercation had not
occurred on his premises.52 The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this
case was astoundingly clear on the matter, recognizing the Castle Doctrine
as an established principle in American law, while stating that since the
altercation did not occur on the defendant’s premises, “if [the defendant]
foresaw that he was to be attacked, as he says he did, then it seems to us,
under the circumstances, he was under obligations to use reasonable efforts
to avoid the necessity of killing [the victim].”53
While the Court did not find Danford’s actions to be justified under the
Castle Doctrine, Justice Hocker’s opinion supported Justice Harlan’s
holding in Beard, maintaining that an individual has an affirmative duty to
retreat “if he may do so without apparently exposing himself to death or
great bodily harm.”54 Since Danford was on a public road, away from his
physical dwelling, the implication in Danford is that the defendant could
have retreated into his physical dwelling, without compromising his safety.
Pell v. State,55 another Florida Supreme Court case, marks the moment
when the Castle Doctrine was first introduced into jury instructions. In this
case, the defendant, Pell, was called to the back of his house, where he
found his brother engaging in an altercation with Officer Walker, the
victim.56 Officer Walker claimed that he had a warrant to search the
premises, but refused to provide this warrant, all the while cursing,
punching, and threatening that he would shoot Pell’s brother.57 Upon seeing
the abuse and hearing the threats, the defendant shot Officer Walker in an
attempt to save his brother’s life.58 The Florida Supreme Court found error
in the lower court’s decision ruling against the defendant, stating that:
[A] man violently assaulted in his own house or on his premises near his house is not
obliged to retreat, but may stand his ground and use such force as may appear to him

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 6.
Danford, 53 Fla. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. (emphasis added).
122 So. 110 (Fla. 1929).
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id.
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as a cautious and prudent man to be necessary to save his life or to save himself from
59
great bodily harm.

Justice Brown’s opinion in Pell seems to indicate that an individual’s belief
that he can retreat to safety is subjective; that it is up to the victim to
determine what is necessary to save her own life. This subjective state of
mind is important when considering the abused woman’s belief that she will
never be able to truly retreat to safety.
The next important case in the Supreme Court of Florida came in
1965. In Hedges v. State,60 a woman was convicted of manslaughter after
killing her “paramour” in her home.61 The lower court refused to grant the
defendant’s request to include complete instructions on justifiable and
excusable homicide in the jury instructions.62 More specifically, the judge
failed to inform the jury that Hedges did not have an affirmative duty to
retreat, since she had been attacked in her own home.63 The rationale for
this, according to the lower court , was that the Castle Doctrine exception
“is not available when, as here, the attacker does not enter as a trespasser.”64
The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion, however, flat-out rejected this
rationale and focused on the victim’s duty—or lack thereof—to retreat
when she is assaulted in her own home.65 The Florida Supreme Court cited
Pell v. State to reiterate that, “when one is violently assaulted in his own
house or immediately surrounding premises, he is not obligated to retreat
but may stand his ground and use such force as prudence and caution
would dictate as necessary to avoid death or great bodily harm.”66 Like
Pell, the Hedges opinion also gives great significance to the subjective
necessity of the victim’s actions. The standard here does not seem to be
reasonableness, but rather subjective belief of imminent harm on the part of
the victim. Furthermore, the Hedges court makes another important
conclusion: Every person’s home is her “ultimate sanctuary” and “[w]hen in
[her] home [she] has ‘retreated to the wall.’”67 Reminiscent of Beard, this
court returned to the fundamental belief that the proverbial “wall” to which
59

Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
172 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1965).
61
Id. at 825. The word “paramour” was used to describe the defendant’s lover, with
whom she had a longstanding relationship, but who was not living with her at the time of his
death. On the day of the incident, Hedges invited her “paramour” onto her property; he did
not enter her home illicitly.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 826.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 827 (emphasis added).
67
Id.
60
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an individual may have to retreat in order to preserve his attacker’s life is,
in fact, that individual’s home. In essence, the Hedges court made a grand
statement, that the home is the ultimate wall, beyond which one can no
longer retreat.
Nonetheless, the next important case in Florida, which reached the
courts in 1982, seemingly turned previous courts’ rationales on their heads
and ignored root principles of the Castle Doctrine.68 In State v. Bobbitt,69
the lower courts refused to include the Castle Doctrine jury instruction in
charges against a wife who killed her husband in their home, after he had
attacked her without provocation.70 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed
the trial court’s decision, holding “that when an assailant and the victim are
legal occupants of the same home, the [C]astle [D]octrine does not apply.”71
Interestingly, the Bobbit court discussed both Pell and Hedges, but
rejected both courts’ arguments by misappropriating the principles behind
the Castle Doctrine. Regarding Pell, the court states, “[i]n our earlier
decision . . . we held that where one is not the aggressor and is violently
assaulted on his own premises by a trespasser, he is not obliged to retreat
but may stand his ground[].”72 Although the Pell court had not emphasized
the initial assailant’s identity as a trespasser, but rather the defendant’s
rights to protect his and his brother’s bodily integrity, the Bobbitt court took
the facts in Pell and shifted the Pell court’s rationale.73 By doing this, the
Bobbitt court introduced the legality of the initial assailant as a central
question to be resolved when deciding whether to grant the Castle Doctrine
instruction.74
The Bobbitt court also addressed Hedges, once again misplacing the
initial facts that the Hedges court emphasized.75 The court conceded that
Hedges established no duty to retreat on the part of a defendant who is
attacked in her own home, but emphasized that even though the lover in
Hedges was not a trespasser, he was also not a “legal co-occupant of the
premises” and therefore, “his initial lawful presence in Hedges’ home was
rendered unlawful by his assault upon her.”76 Even though the Hedges
court—while acknowledging Hedges’ lover was not a trespasser in her
68
69

70
71
72
73
74
75
76

See infra note 70.
415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982).
Id. at 725.
Id. at 724 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 726.
Id.
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home—clearly did not view this fact as dispositive in its decision, the
Bobbitt court erroneously chose to focus on it.77 Even more disturbingly,
the court’s rationale for why the Castle Doctrine does not apply to
cohabitants focuses on property rights, rather than the right to feel safe in
one’s home.78 More importantly, the Bobbitt court does not acknowledge an
important principle set out in Hedges and Beard—the idea that a person
who is attacked in her own home has already retreated as far as she can. The
majority’s opinion holds “that the privilege not to retreat, premised on the
maxim that every man’s home is his castle which he is entitled to protect
from invasion, does not apply here where both Bobbitt and her husband had
equal rights to be in the ‘castle’ and neither had the legal right to eject the
other.”79
In 1999, the Florida Supreme Court remedied its mistake in Bobbitt in
Weiand v. State.80 In Weiand, a wife was charged with first-degree murder
of her husband, having shot him during a violent argument in their
apartment.81 The wife claimed self-defense and presented ample evidence to
show she was suffering from Battered Woman’s Syndrome.82 Nonetheless,
when her defense counsel asked for the Castle Doctrine jury instruction to
be included in her charge, the trial court refused to grant it due to the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Bobbitt.83 Furthermore, the prosecutor
used Weiand’s supposed duty to retreat as a central argument in his closing
statement, stressing that because Weiand had not exhausted every
reasonable way to retreat—even though she was in her own home—she
could not successfully argue for justifiable homicide.84
The Weiand court took into consideration multiple aspects of the
Castle Doctrine before overturning Bobbitt for two main reasons: the first, a
disagreement with “Bobbitt’s minority view that relies on concepts of
property law and possessory rights”; and second, an “increased
understanding of the plight of victims of domestic violence in the years
since [the court’s] decision in Bobbitt.”85 The court’s first reason for
77

Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726.
Id.
79
Id.
80
732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999).
81
Id. at 1048.
82
Id. (discussing, among other things, the several reasons why Weiand was unable to
retreat from the apartment on that particular night: “she had just given birth seven weeks
earlier; she had been choked unconscious; she was paralyzed with terror; and experience had
taught her that her threats of leaving only made her husband more violent”).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 1051.
78
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overturning Bobbitt was correct in criticizing the Bobbitt court’s misplaced
emphasis on property rights, rather than on the rights of the victim being
assailed in her own home.86 As discussed above, shifting the focus away
from the victim’s right to safety toward a consideration of shared property
rights is not only dangerous, but runs contrary to general principles of
criminal law.87 Human life, along with the preservation of bodily integrity,
is the central theme running throughout all cases discussed above.88
Additionally, the Weiand court—citing Pell—acknowledged that a victim
who finds herself attacked in her home has already “retreated to the wall.”89
The Weiand court’s second reason for overturning Bobbitt—the plight
of victims of domestic violence—is an important policy point that will be
discussed in Parts III and IV. Not applying the Castle Doctrine to victims of
domestic violence who ultimately become aggressors in their own home is
especially problematic given psychological and sociological research that
indicates victims of repeated abuse are often unable to leave the cycle of
violence.90
In concluding this section, another look at the progression of the Castle
Doctrine from early English law to the modern day is necessary. As
discussed above, early English principles focus on the victims’ rights to
protect their bodily integrity and property.91 Early cases in American law, as
exemplified through Florida Supreme Court cases, stay true to these
principles and develop the idea that a person attacked in her own home has
retreated as far as she can go; there is no safer place than her home—her
sanctuary.92 These cases, too, focus on the victim and her right not to retreat
when being attacked in a place where she has a legal right to exist.93
II. STATE OF THE LAW
The Florida Supreme Court’s Bobbitt decision illustrates what this
Comment argues is a logical flaw in refusing to apply the Castle Doctrine to
instances of domestic violence between any type of cohabitants. Its
misplaced emphasis on property rights, rather than the right of the victim to
preserve her bodily integrity, set a dangerous precedent within the
86

Id. at 1052.
See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying discussion.
88
The exception to this statement is Bobbitt, a case this Comment argues places a
greater emphasis on property rights than the right to life.
89
Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1050.
90
See id. at 1053; see also infra Parts III, IV.
91
See supra notes 15, 27.
92
See, e.g., Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550 (1895).
93
See, e.g., id.
87
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American legal system and granted less protection to a vulnerable group of
individuals, in a place that is meant to be their sanctuary. Although Bobbitt
was remedied by the Weiand decision, its deeply flawed logic is
emblematic of the modern-day discourse that is still prevalent when it
comes to violence among cohabitants. Additionally, even though Weiand
set a victim-friendly precedent for cases in Florida, the statute itself has not
been amended to take into account the concerns discussed by the Weiand
court.94 The failure to amend the statute to explicitly apply the Castle
Doctrine to instances of domestic violence has resulted in broad discretion,
which courts often use to place a higher burden on those assaulted in their
own homes, by their cohabitants.95
In Spring of 2016, Denise Crisafi published a doctoral dissertation that
set out to provide a summary of “stand your ground” laws in cases of
intimate partner violence.96 According to Crisafi, “one of the primary goals
of [her] study [was] to clarify the basic requirements of self-defense as
expressed through formal statutes that allows individuals to ‘stand their
ground’ as a means of protecting themselves from imminent harm.”97 As
briefly discussed above, a change in case law does not necessarily mean a
change in the state’s statute. The Weiand decision in Florida, for example,
no longer precludes the Castle Doctrine defense from being applied to
instances of domestic violence. However, it does not automatically grant it
either. According to Douglas A. Orr, the Weiand court did not go so far as
to adopt the permissible standards of the Hedges court.98 The holding in
Weiand, although specifically stating that there is no duty to retreat from the
residence, also stated that there is a limited duty to retreat within the
residence, “to the extent reasonably possible.”99
According to Crisafi, the state of the law is similar in many other
“stand your ground” states.100 Of the twenty-three states that currently have
94

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2014).
See infra Part III (discussing the status of the law in all fifty states, including Florida,
regarding the application of the Castle Doctrine to instances of domestic violence); see also
Irin Carmon, Can Women Stand Their Ground? Depends on the Target., MSNBC (Mar. 20,
2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/can-women-stand-their-ground.
96
Crisafi, supra note 10.
97
Id. at 90.
98
Douglas A. Orr, Weiand v. State, and Battered Spouse Syndrome: The Toothless
Tigress Can Now Roar, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 125, 134 (2000) (“For this reason, the Court
decided to limit, or recede from Hedges.”).
99
Id. at 135; see also Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999).
100
Crisafi, supra note 10, at 106–07. A “Stand your Ground” state is defined as a state
whose laws permit individuals to use deadly force for self-protection, even if they could
safely retreat. Id. at 90.
95
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“stand your ground” laws incorporated into their statutes, only four
(Arizona, Georgia, Kentucky, and Michigan) “were found to have
incorporated language into their Stand Your Ground statutes that provide
greater acknowledgement and enforcement of protections from victims of
domestic violence and family violence.”101 More pertinent to our
discussion, eight states (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, Michigan,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee) require victims of domestic
violence to retreat before responding with deadly force.102 The
unambiguous exception to this duty is when there is an active injunction,
order for protection, or other similar document.103
Thus, examining the state of the law, we can see why it is important
for there to be clear standards on this matter. If a victim of domestic
violence finds herself in one of the states whose laws require her to retreat
before using deadly force, she may be out of luck. Even if she finds herself
in one of the other states, both case law and statutory law may be
ambiguous enough that she may also be out of luck. Either way, this is not
an area where shades of grey should be acceptable.
III. THE CASTLE DOCTRINE IN MODERN ACADEMIC DISCOURSE
The Castle Doctrine has been widely discussed in literature, especially
as of late, due to the expansion of self-defense laws.104 The themes
discussed in the literature reviewed for this Comment generally fall into
three categories: general discussion of self-defense principles, discussion of
power and gender dynamics, and discussion of property rights in the
context of cohabitation. This Comment’s treatment of the first category
includes a thorough exploration of two key concepts: “stand your ground”
and “retreat to the wall.” This Part then explores cultural and gender norms
as they relate to differing expectations when men and women engage in
physical conflicts. Finally, the consequences of domestic violence on
property rights and cohabitation are examined.
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF SELF-DEFENSE PRINCIPLES

Generally, there seems to be growing concern about the expansion of
101

Id. at 112.
Id. at 108–09 (Table 3: “Stand Your Ground Statutes: Domestic Violence”).
103
Id.
104
See, e.g., Brandi L. Jackson, No Ground on Which to Stand: Revise Stand Your
Ground Laws so Survivors of Domestic Violence Are No Longer Incarcerated for Defending
Their Lives, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 154 (2015) (discussing how the shooting of
Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman prompted a nation-wide discussion about “Stand
Your Ground” laws).
102
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self-defense laws in the United States.105 The distinction between defense of
habitation (i.e., invocation of the Castle Doctrine) and self-defense is often
seen as the distinction between a threat to a person’s life and a threat to a
person’s home or dwelling.106 However, especially in cases of cohabitant
violence, these two concepts cannot be divorced. Since domestic violence—
as the name would dictate—takes place in the home, it is necessary to
consider the victim’s right to safety before balancing it against the property
rights of her cohabitant.
The Model Penal Code is clear about the use of deadly force for selfprotection: it can only be used if the “actor believes that such force is
necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury,
kidnapping, or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat.”107 An
individual, however, cannot use deadly force for self-protection if he
provoked the use of force against him during the same encounter or if he
could have safely retreated from the conflict and did not do so.108
Nevertheless, the Model Penal Code is also clear about situations in which
an individual does not have to retreat: “the actor is not obliged to retreat
from his dwelling or place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is
assailed in his place of work by another person whose place of work the
actor knows it to be.”109 The language of the Model Penal Code seems to
imply that individuals who are attacked in their homes by cohabitants have
the same right to not retreat as individuals attacked in their homes by
intruders. Since the Code qualifies the exception of non-retreat for
individuals who work in the same place, but not for individuals who live in
the same place, we must assume that this distinction was intentional.110
The Castle Doctrine, with all of its embodied self-contradictions,
seems to find itself at the crux of the conflict between the sanctity of human
life and the sanctity of the human sanctuary known as the home.111
Catherine Carpenter, Professor of Law at Southwestern University School
of Law, argues that “the Castle Doctrine allows the resident to stand ground
and use deadly force against the intruder to protect the sanctity of the home

105

See generally Catalfamo, supra note 31 (talking about the expansion and codification
of “Stand Your Ground” laws in Florida); Elaine M. Chiu, Culture in Our Midst, 17 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231 (2006) (discussing an overall trend in American law to reject the
British tradition of retreat to the wall).
106
Chiu, supra note 105, at 247.
107
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
108
Id. at § 3.04(2)(b)(i)–(ii).
109
Id. at § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A).
110
Id. at § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A).
111
Carpenter, supra note 8, at 657–58.
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from the attempted atrocious felony because the duty to retreat would be
incompatible with the goal of preventing the commission of the felony.”112
On one hand, opponents of the expanded view of the Castle Doctrine
seem to champion the sanctity of human life, arguing that removing the
affirmative duty to retreat in conflicts such as the one between Mary and
Bob, places too little importance on protecting the aggressor-victim’s
bodily integrity.113 They argue, essentially, that the removal of the duty to
retreat may give some individuals free license to kill, when in reality they
do not truly feel their life is being threatened.114 On the other hand,
proponents of the expanded Castle Doctrine place extreme importance on
the sanctity of the home; the idea that an individual should not be attacked
in her safe space, her sanctuary.115 Like many of the Florida Supreme Court
opinions discussed above, they argue that a victim who is attacked in her
own home has essentially retreated as far as she can. Her home, her
“sanctuary,” cannot be distinguished from the proverbial “wall.”116
The concept of “retreat to the wall”117 has been prominently discussed
in relevant literature.118 It is especially important as it relates to the Castle
Doctrine, since retreating into the home generally means that an individual
has retreated as far as she can go, to the place where she is supposed to be
safest.119 This concept becomes infinitely more important as we discuss the
applicability of the Castle Doctrine to instances of domestic violence. In
Mary’s case, for example, she was repeatedly attacked in her sanctuary—
the place where she should have been safe, the place where she ordinarily
would have retreated to escape the abuse. It follows, then, that victims of
domestic violence who are required to retreat have a different wall they
must retreat to. They are compelled to stay in their home, alongside their
abuser, because their home is their supposed sanctuary.120 Once they find
112

Id. at 667.
See, e.g., Steven P. Aggergaard, Criminal Law—Retreat from Reason: How
Minnesota’s New No-Retreat Rule Confuses the Law and Cries for Alteration—State v.
Glowacki, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 657 (2002). But see Alexis M. Haddox, The Ohio
Castle Doctrine: Shielding Criminals With a Presumption of Self-Defense, 41 CAP. U. L.
REV. 1105 (2013).
114
See id.
115
Carpenter, supra note 8, at 660.
116
See supra notes 55, 61.
117
See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 3.04(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
118
See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 8; see also Chiu, supra note 105.
119
Carpenter, supra note 8, at 667 (arguing that, “[h]aving retreated as far as possible,
the actor should not be compelled to leave the sanctuary”).
120
The next part of this Comment will contain a lengthier discussion of the implications
of the phrase “retreat to the wall” in cases of domestic violence.
113
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themselves in a situation where they need a place of safe retreat, this place
becomes nearly impossible to find. Essentially, these victims are held to a
more stringent standard than the rest of the population, even though they are
generally more vulnerable.121 Elaine Chiu, Associate Professor of Law at St.
John’s University School of Law, has argued that “contemporary statements
of the rule of retreat no longer incorporate references to the wall.”122 This
trend further blurs the boundaries between “the wall” of the abused woman
and “the wall” of the ordinary citizen being attacked. If the obligation is
simply to retreat, then the question that begs an answer is: where? If the
answer is anywhere (irrespective of the fact that those attacked in their own
homes have already retreated), then how far is an abused woman supposed
to retreat? Chiu believes that “[t]he obligation to retreat whenever one has
an available safe option can have troubling consequences.”123
This survey of the literature seems to indicate that while there is a
growing concern for the expansion of self-defense laws in the United
States, these laws have not been expanded to address instances of domestic
violence. While cases such as Trayvon Martin’s have gained national
notoriety due to a misuse of expanded self-defense laws, cases where
domestic violence leads the victims to murder have continued to fall
through the cracks and have not benefitted from this expansion.
DISCUSSION OF POWER AND GENDER DYNAMICS

Theoretically, the discourse behind Stand Your Ground rules in
general and the Castle Doctrine in particular should be appealing to women.
As Mary Ann Franks points out, “Stand Your Ground rhetoric is very
seductive, and perhaps particularly to a feminist perspective.”124 Proponents
of such self-defense laws often invoke the image of a defenseless woman
getting raped by a stranger in a dark alley in order to illustrate the need for
doctrines that will allow her to fight her attacker with deadly force.125
However, the reality is that stranger rape is low on the list of violent acts a
woman is likely to experience in her lifetime; most rape victims are raped
by someone they know, in a familiar place that can be considered their

121

For a more in-depth discussion of the vulnerability of victims of domestic violence,
see infra Parts III and IV.
122
Chiu, supra note 105, at 242.
123
Id. at 242.
124
Mary Ann Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground,
Battered Women’s Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099,
1108 (2014).
125
Id.
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castle (e.g., house, college dorm, or car).126 As such, in a world where the
Castle Doctrine does not cover cohabitant violence, women seem to have
less recourse in the place where they are most vulnerable—their homes.
The concept of “being a man” is tightly connected to one’s right to
defend his home and property, as well as not retreat from unprovoked
attacks.127 Stand Your Ground laws, which include the Castle Doctrine, are
often seen as the “true man” doctrine: an assumption that a true man would
not and should not be obligated to retreat in the face of an attacker.128 On
the contrary, a “true man” should face the challenge, meet force with force,
and even kill if necessary.129
For women, however, the Castle Doctrine has presented problems in
its applicability to domestic violence.130 As discussed in Part IV, abused
women are often asked why they don’t leave their abuser and why they do
not escape the cycle of violence.131 Implicit in this question is an
inapplicability of the Castle Doctrine to women—the idea that they, unlike
their male counterparts, do not have a right to meet an attack happening in
their home with deadly force.132
Not surprisingly, the laws governing self-defense were written by
men.133 These laws, which focus on the doctrine of equal force, are
realistically only applicable to men with comparable physical force, not to
conflicts between men and women, most of which are not physically
equitable.134 A woman who is repeatedly abused by her husband most likely
does not have the physical tools to repel his force with equal bodily force;
most women tend to be physically weaker than their male counterparts. In
this situation, her only option is to grab an external object (gun, baseball
bat, etc.) and give herself at least some of the force necessary to repel her
attacker. “Responding to his abuse with proportional force is not an option
126

Id.
Chiu, supra note 105, at 245 (discussing the rule of retreat being equated to
cowardice, not “bravery, honor, and true masculinity”).
128
Carpenter, supra note 8, at 655; see also Suk, supra note 13.
129
See generally Franks, supra note 124.
130
Id. at 1111.
131
See generally infra Part IV.
132
Franks, supra note 124, at 1111.
133
See discussion infra Part I (discussing books and judicial opinions written by male
academics and judges).
134
See Orr, supra note 98, at 136. Orr argues that the doctrine of equal force evolved
because men had a “wide range of weapons and abilities from which [they could] select a
degree of force proportional to that of [their] attacker. However, because women are
generally physically smaller and weaker than men, the equal force requirement is impractical
in the context of domestic abuse and self-defense.” Id.
127
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for her, so she must rely on the next best thing – a greater force.”135 Most
women cannot repel a man’s physical attack without the use of an external
object.136
This inherent difference between men and women puts another wrench
into the discussion about the reasonableness of responding to conflict as
Mary did in the second scenario. The laws of self-defense say that Mary
should have responded to Bob’s attack with equal force, but nothing more.
Now, suppose Bob is a six-foot man who weighs two hundred pounds.
Mary, on the other hand, is five feet two inches and weighs one hundred
and thirty pounds. Is there any scenario in which she could have responded
to her husband’s threats by not using a deadly weapon?
DISCUSSION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF MARRIAGE
OR COHABITATION

Property laws have become relevant in the discussion surrounding the
Castle Doctrine since courts have attempted to use the classification of the
victim-aggressor as a determinant for instructing the jury on the defendant’s
affirmative duty to retreat.137 One of the primary goals behind owning
property is enjoying the rights that come with it. Among them is the right to
exclude others from the said property—the right to keep individuals
deemed as trespassers off the territory where one enjoys possessory
rights.138 When a piece of property is commonly owned by two individuals,
and particularly when these individuals are legally bound to one another
(through marriage or civil union), neither individual enjoys the right to
exclude the other from enjoying the said property.139 As such, no intrusion
can be established.140
It is often the case that the victim-aggressor’s property rights rival the
victim’s rights to defend herself.141 Since in situations of domestic violence
in these cases, the site in question is often the home of both the aggressor
and the victim, in the eyes of the law, both individuals have a right not to
retreat from their castle. However, in the case of domestic violence, this

135

Id. at 137.
See Orr, supra note 98, at 136–37.
137
Carpenter, supra note 8, at 69.
138
See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L.
REV. 730 (1998).
139
See D. Benjamin Barros, Legal Questions for the Psychology of Home, 83 TUL. L.
REV. 645, 650–51 (2009).
140
Id. at 651.
141
See generally Jackson, supra note 104.
136
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right becomes an impediment to self-defense.142
The question of property rights in the context of domestic violence is
intimately connected to the Castle Doctrine.143 It is not coincidental that
most early sources address the Castle Doctrine by defining the home as the
man’s castle.144 Traditionally, the home was seen as the place “where the
male head of household could govern the inhabitants as he saw fit.”145 The
castle was the property of the man; the woman was the inhabitant who had
to conform to the rules set by her husband.146
Today, not much has changed. Domestic violence is closely connected
to homelessness.147 Being a victim of domestic violence forces many
abused women to flee the home.148 In fact, “domestic violence is a leading
cause of homelessness nationally.”149 This fact speaks to the argument that,
as far as shared property is concerned, not much has changed since the days
of the man’s castle.150 This particular point is relevant as an indicator in the
discussion of gender dynamics, to illustrate the fact that many men and
women are still not on equal footing when it comes to their “castles.” It
would not be a stretch to assume that those women who choose
homelessness over continued domestic violence feel vulnerable in their
homes—that they do not feel secure enough in their proprietary interests to
eject their abuser instead of ejecting themselves. This conclusion is yet
another indicator of the vulnerability of domestic violence victims.
The three themes discussed above—self-defense, power and gender
dynamics, and property rights—all speak to one common argument: that the
abused woman is vulnerable from multiple points of view. Firstly, her
sanctuary is repeatedly violated by her abuser, leaving her with no safe
option for retreat. Secondly, unlike the “true man,” she grows to believe
that a “true woman” does not meet force with force. Even if she wanted to,
142
Id. at 178 (arguing that “requiring an abused partner to retreat from her home while
under attack by a person who has an equal legal right to be in the home shifts the focus from
the person claiming self-defense to the attacker. . . . The batterer’s relative possessory rights
should not impede on the fact finder’s conclusion that she felt imminently threatened, and
that her actions were justified.”).
143
Johnson, supra note 25, at 11–12.
144
See infra Part I (discussing cases where the phrase “a man’s home is his castle” is
used repeatedly).
145
Johnson, supra note 25, at 12.
146
See Johnson, supra note 25.
147
Id. at 13.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See generally Johnson, supra note 25 (discussing the fact that the laws of property
are disadvantageous to abused women).
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she often cannot. Thirdly, even though legally she may be entitled to half of
the marital property, she may not believe that she has these rights. To her,
an escape may be synonymous with further abuse, societal scrutiny, and
homelessness. This means that the Castle Doctrine must be applied to
conflicts between cohabitants, so that victims of domestic abuse can enjoy
the minimum amount of safety that is generally afforded to victims of
stranger crimes.
IV. ADVOCATING FOR APPLICATION OF THE CASTLE DOCTRINE TO
INSTINCES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
As briefly mentioned above, there is a strong argument to be made for
the applicability of the Castle Doctrine to instances of domestic violence,
where the victim-defendant and the aggressor-victim are legal cohabitants
of the same dwelling. Nonetheless, only one study to date has addressed
whether application of the Castle Doctrine to domestic violence situations is
actually beneficial to women by clarifying often-contested elements such as
reasonableness and imminence.151 Although the law in most states no longer
makes an explicit distinction between the applicability of the Castle
Doctrine to men who are attacked in their homes and women who are
abused by their cohabitants, “strong traces of it remain in the decisions of
many courts (of both law and public opinion) to expect a woman to leave
her home if she is being abused.”152
As such, this Comment advocates for the applicability of the Castle
Doctrine in instances where the defendant is the victim of domestic
violence. First, excluding these victims from benefitting from the Castle
Doctrine jury instruction in cases where they cohabitate with their abuser is
a misunderstanding and misapplication of the doctrine as it was first
introduced in the American legal system. The Castle Doctrine did not focus

151

See generally STEVEN JANSEN & M. ELAINE NUGENT-BORAKOVE, NAT’L DIST.
ATTORNEYS ASS’N, EXPANSIONS TO THE CASTLE DOCTRINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND
PRACTICE 5 (2007); Judith E. Koons, Gunsmoke and Legal Mirrors: Women Surviving
Intimate Battery and Deadly Legal Doctrines, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 617 (2006).
152
Franks, supra note 124, at 1112 (arguing that “[i]n other words, while men, whose
violent confrontations inside the home are likely to involve strangers, are allowed to stand
and fight, women, whose violent confrontations inside the home are likely to involve
cohabitants, are effectively expected to retreat”); see Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights
to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623,
628 (1980); see also Jackson, supra note 104, at 171 (“While both statutory and case law
have progressed in recognizing and addressing the plight of domestic violence survivors, the
disparities that result from prosecutorial discretion, and the implicit biases and stereotypes
about domestic abuse, inhibit survivors’ ability to benefit from [Stand Your Ground laws]
even where their actions should be justified.”).
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on property and possessory rights, but rather on the right to defend oneself
in one’s dwelling. Since generally, victims of domestic violence are doing
exactly that when they kill or seriously injure their abusers, they should
benefit from receiving the Castle Doctrine jury instructions.
The second argument explores the power dynamics between victims
and aggressors. Mainly, it looks at the power differential between these two
parties and attempts to explain how, given these circumstances, a victim of
domestic violence has already “retreated to the wall,” given the context in
which she is abused. Given these considerations, imposing an affirmative
duty to retreat on the victim-defendant becomes an almost nonsensical
contention, asking an individual to do something that is virtually
impossible.153
The discourse surrounding the Castle Doctrine in jurisdictions other
than Florida is informative in examining both arguments. Until recently,
New Jersey law, for example, allowed an individual to defend herself
against intruders without imposing a duty to retreat, but required the same
individual “to retreat from her home before using deadly force against her
cohabitant attacker.”154 The victim-aggressor had a perverse social status;
she was expected to react vehemently against a burglar who might have
been looking to steal her jewelry or television set, but she was not allowed
to act with the same force against her cohabitant, the person who arguably
embodies her biggest threat.155
In Minnesota, a duty to retreat exists as a general rule, but this duty
does not apply in the case of a home intrusion.156 The issue of the
applicability of the Castle Doctrine in the case of cohabitant violence was
addressed in State v. Glowacki,157 where the Minnesota Supreme Court
“surveyed the probable effect [of not applying the Castle Doctrine to
cohabitants] on women who face domestic violence, and asserted that a
parent facing attack should not have to abandon her children.”158 The Court
emphasized the importance of safety in one’s home, stressing that the
concept of retreating in self-defense necessarily includes a safer place to
153

Melissa Wheatcroft, Duty to Retreat for Cohabitants—In New Jersey a Battered
Spouse’s Home is Not Her Castle, 30 RUTGERS. L.J. 539, 556–57 (1999) (discussing that
although each abusive relationship is unique, they all “often share a common characteristic:
the victim of the batterer remains in the relationship with her batterer for some period of time
despite the abuse. Demanding retreat from a cohabitant who has lived with abuse for an
extended period is asking the impossible.”).
154
Id. at 542.
155
Id. at 553.
156
See Aggergaard, supra note 113, at 675–76.
157
630 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 2001).
158
Aggergaard, supra note 113, at 681.
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retreat—usually one’s home.159 However, when the violence occurs
precisely in that safe space, it would be fundamentally unfair to force a
cohabitant to retreat.160
In Ohio, when applying the Castle Doctrine to violence among
cohabitants, courts must take into account the fault requirement.161 For
example, in State v. Thomas,162 the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the
defendant Thomas’ conviction for shooting and killing her live-in boyfriend
because she did not have a duty to retreat in her own home.163 However,
had the deceased boyfriend managed to wrestle the gun away from Thomas
and subsequently killed her, he would not have been able to invoke the
Castle Doctrine because he was the one who caused the situation.164
Finally, in Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the
duty to retreat does not apply to cohabitants acting in self-defense.165 In
Commonwealth v. Derby,166 the court “noted a recent shift from protecting
the rights of the deceased to protecting the rights of the individual acting in
self-defense, as laid out by the drafters of the Model Penal Code.”167
After surveying the progression of the Castle Doctrine in various
jurisdictions, with a particular focus on Florida and the cases discussed in
Section I, it becomes starkly obvious that the Castle Doctrine should not be
qualified in instances where the victim and the aggressor are cohabitants.
First, this qualification draws focus away from the victim’s right to
feel safe in her own home, and places an inappropriate amount of emphasis
on the victim-aggressor’s property rights; an emphasis that is inconsistent
with its English roots, but also with early American cases such as Beard,
discussed in Part I of this Comment. The only way in which the cohabitant
exception could make sense would be in a world where property rights take
priority over human life; otherwise, there would be no reason to limit this
long-standing doctrine.
Second, requiring victims of domestic violence to retreat before using
159

Id. at 682.
Id. at 681.
161
See Haddox, supra note 113, at 1112 (arguing that the “no-fault requirement serve[s]
as a safeguard because it mandate[s] further inquiry into the circumstances”).
162
673 N.E.2d 1339 (Ohio 1997).
163
Id. at 1343; see also Haddox, supra note 113, at 1111.
164
Thomas, 673 N.E.2d at 1343.
165
Joshua G. Light, The Castle Doctrine – The Lobby is My Dwelling, 22 WIDENER L.J.
219, 231 (2012) (“In rejecting the trial court’s instructions, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held that . . . the duty to retreat does not apply to an individual acting in selfdefense against another individual where both individuals reside in the same dwelling.”).
166
678 A.2d 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
167
Light, supra note 165 at 231; see also Derby, 678 A.2d at 785–86.
160
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deadly force to defend themselves in their own homes breaks with the entire
concept of “retreat to the wall” because an abused partner has no place to
retreat; she has retreated as far as she can,168 and it is in her place of retreat
that she continues to be abused. Jurisdictions that do not grant this defense
to victims of domestic violence place a high burden on them—the burden of
retreating to a non-existent wall, or attempting an escape that,
paradoxically, might end her life quicker than it would save it.169
V. THE BATTERED WOMAN’S CASTLE
The concept of helplessness can be analyzed through psychological
and sociological research to shape a more focused argument for why
denying victims of domestic violence the Castle Doctrine instruction is
inherently wrong. Women who have been repeatedly abused have a
permeating feeling of helplessness, which essentially makes it impossible
for them to leave the home in which they are being abused. Since they
cannot meet their partner’s force with equal force,170 they are effectively
faced with two choices: to continue accepting the abuse or to meet their
partner’s force with deadly force and face a prison sentence without
recourse. It is true that some women do actually leave their abusers.
According to the Domestic Violence Intervention Program, more than 50%
of women leave their abusive partners.171 However, the same organization
states that “leaving a battering partner may be the most dangerous time in
that relationship”, since “women are 70 times more likely to be killed in the
two weeks after leaving than at any other time during the relationship.”172
As such, it is important to view these statistics in light of the discussion that
follows, and consider why it is fundamentally unfair to require women to
leave.
Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) was first introduced into the legal
profession by Lenore Walker, in the late 1970s.173 According to Walker, a
168

See infra Part I (discussing opinions that view the home as the ultimate place of

retreat).
169

See supra Parts I–II (discussing that some jurisdictions do not allow or have not
allowed the Castle Doctrine in cases of domestic violence among cohabitants, “assume that a
‘safe retreat’ can actually exist for a victim of battering and that escaping alive from this
particular episode of violence is the equivalent of ‘safely retreating’”).
170
See supra Part II.
171
Myths and Facts About Domestic Violence, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION
PROGRAM, http://www.dvipiowa.org/myths-facts-about-domestic-violence (last visited Oct.
4, 2016).
172
Id.
173
See Marina Angel, The Myth of the Battered Woman, 24 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV.
301, 302 (2015); see also LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 45–51 (1979).
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battered woman is part of a cyclical relationship and does not become a
battered woman until she has gone through two such cycles.174 The cycle
begins with escalating tension, continues with severe abuse, then concludes
with loving relief.175 A central part in this cycle is the concept of learned
helplessness—an idea that the battered woman becomes more helpless as
time goes by; the longer she gets abused, the harder it will be for her to
leave her abuser, rendering her helpless.176 “A battered woman . . . does not
have to learn that she cannot escape one man’s battering, but rather that she
cannot escape men’s overall coercion.”177 As it connects to the earlier
discussion of the Castle Doctrine, the concept of learned helplessness
illustrates the most problematic aspect of the Castle Doctrine exception:178 a
battered woman’s helplessness does not allow her to leave her “castle,”
even if she may intellectually know it is the right thing to do.179
Paradoxically, one of the most frequent questions asked about abused
women is: why doesn’t she just leave?180 Outside observers, particularly
those who have not experienced abuse themselves, struggle with
understanding why abused women are so helpless; why it is that they are
not able to simply escape the cycle of abuse.181 According to Mary Ann
Dutton, this cycle of abuse is best understood “as a single and continuing
entity, one whose character may change over time, but that nevertheless
forever changes the nature of the relationship.”182 As such, battered women
do not foresee an end in sight to the violence; they are under constant
attack. This particular piece of the battered woman literature is crucial in
174

WALKER, supra note 173, at 55–70.
Id. at 55.
176
Id. at 45 (deriving the concept of learned helplessness from Martin Seligman’s
experiments with dogs, in which dogs that were repeatedly exposed to electric shock therapy
were increasingly less likely to protest the abuse).
177
Id. at 48.
178
The “Castle Doctrine exception” here is used to refer to instances where the Castle
Doctrine defense is not offered to victims of domestic violence, due to the fact that they were
attacked by a cohabitant in a home that was legally co-owned.
179
See WALKER, supra note 173, at 47.
180
Id. at 43 (“Both the batterer and the battered woman fear they cannot survive alone,
and so continue to maintain a bizarre symbiotic relationship from which they cannot
extricate themselves.”).
181
See id.; see also Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic
Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1208
(1993).
182
See Dutton, supra note 181, at 1208 (“The battered woman’s fear, vigilance, or
perception that she has few options may persist, even when long periods of time elapse
between the physically or sexually violent episodes, and even when the abusive partner
appears to be peaceful and calm.”).
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understanding why battered women who are attacked in their own homes
cannot retreat anywhere: for them, the attack is constant and the retreat
impossible.183 It then becomes paramount for these women, who are
constantly being attacked in their own homes, to not have an affirmative
duty to retreat: indeed, placing this duty upon them puts them in a situation
of impossibility, since resisting their attacker is something they simply
cannot do.
The Survivor Theory, an alternative to the Battered Woman Syndrome,
explains a victim’s inability to leave the abusive cycle differently.184 Instead
of looking at the battered woman as a helpless individual, the Survivor
Theory sees her as an active agent.185 Unlike Walker’s battered woman, this
individual makes a choice not to leave, having logically determined that no
other alternative is plausible.186 The Survivor Theory actively resists
labeling victims who stay in abusive relationships as “passive or weak.”187
Leigh Goodmark, Associate Professor at University of Baltimore School of
Law, says that:
[W]omen who fight back are those with the fewest other options for addressing the
violence against them. They are women who lack access to resources, women who
may be afraid or unwilling to turn to the police or other professionals for assistance,
and women whose marginalized status may deprive them of the ability to make
188
choices other than retaliation.

The Survivor Theory “emphasizes [the] strength, resilience, and ultimate
triumph over the violence.”189
Regardless of which theory one finds more or less convincing, both
Battered Woman Syndrome and the Survivor Theory have one important
point in common: they both effectively eliminate an abused woman’s
ability to leave her home when it is the epicenter of her abuse. Either
through complex psychological processes190 or through conscious

183

See WALKER, supra note 173.
See generally EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS
SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS (1988).
185
See Leigh Goodmark, When is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 85 (2008) (“Having determined that help is not
available, the survivor may come to the rational conclusion that she may be more likely to
survive if she suffers physical violence within the relationship than if she attempts to
leave.”).
186
Jackson, supra note 104, at 165.
187
Goodmark, supra note 185, at 84.
188
Id. at 77.
189
Id. at 85.
190
See supra text accompanying note 176.
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choices,191 it is vital to understand that abused women192 do not believe that
they can retreat.
Returning to the scenario between Mary and Bob, it can be safely
assumed that Mary would be classified as a battered woman, according to
Walker’s criteria.193 When Bob attacks her in their home, as he has done
countless times before, Mary is not likely to believe that she will be able to
escape his attacks if she leaves the home. In a state where Mary’s retaliation
against Bob’s attack would not be protected under the Castle Doctrine—a
state194 where a woman, abused in her own castle, has the affirmative duty
to retreat before using deadly force—Mary would find herself in an
impossible situation: being essentially forced to accept the abuse. If we
accept either Battered Woman Syndrome or the Survivor Theory as reality,
we also have to accept Mary’s feeling of helplessness (which is likely to
worsen with time) as a reality, deeming her powerless in the face of her
husband’s violence. Learned helplessness is pertinent to this Comment
because it speaks to the woman’s belief that she cannot safely retreat away
from her abuser, that no matter what she does, she will never be safe. The
impossibility of retreat is a key aspect of applying the Castle Doctrine to
instances of domestic violence. If we can successfully argue that, at the time
of the attack, the woman had no reasonable belief that she could safely
retreat from her abuser, then the concept of “retreat” becomes moot. If, on
the other hand, this aspect becomes highly contentious, it will be more
difficult to argue that there was no possibility of retreat when, in fact, there
might have been (i.e., the bathroom in Mary and Bob’s case).
The cyclical nature of the Battered Woman is important in
understanding the predictability of an abusive relationship—the idea that
the same pattern will repeat, over and over again, until either the victim
breaks it by leaving (a rare scenario) or the abuser breaks it by killing the
victim or physically impairing her so severely that she is no longer able to
keep the abuse a secret from close friends and relatives.195 This concept is
191

See GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 184.
When discussing abused women in this context, this Comment does not refer to
women who have been victims of a single abusive episode; rather, it refers to women who
can be classified as battered women according to Walker’s criteria, described in more detail
above.
193
See generally WALKER, supra note 173.
194
See supra text accompanying note 10; see also supra Part II (discussing the states
where a victim of domestic violence has a duty to retreat in her own home).
195
Melissa K. Slate, Domestic Violence Comprehensive, The Secret Epidemic, RN
(May 2016), http://www.rn.org/courses/coursematerial-140.pdf (“In 2004, 1,544 deaths were
attributed to domestic violence. Florida [the focus of this Comment] had 115,170 cases of
domestic violence in 2006, 54% of these cases ended in an arrest.”).
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once again relevant for the purpose of “retreating to the wall.” If the
theories behind Battered Woman Syndrome and the Survivor Theory are
correct and the relationship between the victim and the abuser is cyclical,
the prospect of retreat once again becomes irrelevant because a temporary
retreat (i.e. leaving the apartment for a night) is just that—temporary. If we
trust this research, we trust the fact that a victim will see this type of retreat
as temporary, not as a solution to her overall problem. Furthermore, the
victim also knows that attempting to retreat will make her abuser even
angrier and more likely to seriously hurt or even kill her. In this alternative
scenario, the victim may be able to contemplate a type of retreat, but
quickly realizes that it would be pointless in the face of her cohabitant’s
pattern of violence.
A lingering question still remains: why should the legal system not
invoke justifiable homicide in cases where domestic violence victims
retaliate against their abusers and end up killing them? Due to disparities
among state laws, the Model Penal Code is the best tool to answer this
question. The Code defines self-defense as “justifiable when the actor
believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of
protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on
the present occasion.”196 The words “immediately” and “necessary” are key
here—elements that must be proven in order for the defense to be
presented. The problem with proving these elements when it comes to
domestic violence is painfully obvious—often, the only witnesses to these
violent episodes are the victim and the offender. In such cases, it is nearly
impossible to set forth a defense that would satisfy a reasonable jury.
Furthermore, returning to the idea that the Castle Doctrine is still alive
in the United States, and that individuals attacked in their own homes by
non-cohabitants are almost always allowed to present this defense (which is
often successful), the question of inherent fairness merits one last mention.
To place a higher burden on victims of domestic violence than on, for
example, an acquaintance who attacks an individual in his own home—is
downright perplexing. This vulnerable population, these victims who often
simply cannot escape their abusers, should be afforded more, not less
protection.
FINAL THOUGHTS
This Comment argues for a uniform application of the Castle Doctrine
instructions to the jury, regardless of the cohabitation between victim and
assailant. The rationale behind this argument is simple; applying the Castle
196

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (emphasis added).
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Doctrine any other way treats victims of domestic violence inequitably and
unfairly penalizes them for, quite literally, fighting for their lives.
As discussed in Part III of this Comment, the Model Penal Code does
not make a distinction between the applicability of the Castle Doctrine to
incidents involving intruders and those involving cohabitants; it only
qualifies its applicability in cases where the victim and the aggressor work
together. This application should be adopted uniformly by jurisdictions
throughout the United States, in order to avoid the inherent unfairness that
comes with making abused women fight for their lives.
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